International Research Journal of Commerce , Arts and Science

 ( Online- ISSN 2319 - 9202 )     New DOI : 10.32804/CASIRJ

Impact Factor* - 6.2311


**Need Help in Content editing, Data Analysis.

Research Gateway

Adv For Editing Content

   No of Download : 0    Submit Your Rating     Cite This   Download        Certificate

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES IN INDIA

    1 Author(s):  PUSHPA N GOWDA

Vol -  3, Issue- 2 ,         Page(s) : 433 - 437  (2012 ) DOI : https://doi.org/10.32804/CASIRJ

Abstract

Since April 2010, when Business Roundtable last updated its Principles of Corporate Governance, Indian public corporations have continued to adopt best practices within the framework of strengthened securities market listing standards and legal requirements that developed beginning with the passage of Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Securities and Exchange Board of India act.Business Roundtable continues to believe, as we noted in Principles of Corporate Governance (2005), that the India has the best corporate governance, financial reporting and securities markets systems in the world. These systems work because of the adoption of best practices by public companies within a framework of laws and regulations that establish minimum requirements while affording companies the ability to develop individualized practices that are appropriate for them. Even in the challenging times posed by the ongoing difficult economic environment, corporations have continued to work proactively to refine their governance practices, and develop new practices, as conditions change and "best practices" continue to evolve.

1. Claessens, S., Feijen, E. and Laeven, L. (2008), “Political connections and preferential access to finance: the role of campaign contributions”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 88, pp. 554-80. Coles, J.L., Daniel, N.D. and Naveen, L. (2008), “Boards: does one size fit all”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 87, pp. 329-56.
2. Denis, D.K. (2001), “Twenty-five years of corporate governance research and counting”, Review of Financial Economics, Vol. 10, pp. 191-212.
3. Dyck, A., Volchkova, N. and Zingales, L. (2008), “The corporate governance role of the media: evidence from Russia”, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 63, pp. 1093-135.
4. Erkens, D., Hung, M. and Matos, P.P. (2010), “Corporate governance in the 2007-2008 financial crisis: evidence from financial institutions worldwide”, ECGI-Finance Working Paper No. 249/2009, paper presented at CELS 2009 4th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper. Faleye, O. (2007), “Classified boards, firm value and managerial entrenchment”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 83, pp. 501-29.
5. Fan, J.P.H., Wong, T.J. and Zhang, T. (2005), “The emergence of corporate pyramids in China”, working paper, available at: www.SSRN.org
6. Fan, J.P.H., Wong, T.J. and Zhang, T. (2007), “Politically-connected CEOs, corporate governance and post-IPO performance of China’s newly partially privatized firms”, Journal of Financial Economic, Vol. 84, pp. 330-57.
7. Fan, J.P.H., Wong, T.J. and Zhang, T. (2008), “Succession: the role of specialized assets and transfer costs”, working paper, available at: www.SSRN.org
8. Fisman, R. (2001), “Estimating the value of political connections”, American Economic Review, Vol. 91, pp. 1095-102.
9. Goriaev, Alexei. and Konstantin Sonin, 2005, “Is Political Risk Company-Specific? The
10. Market Side of the Yukos Affair,” EFA 2005 Moscow Meetings paper.Guriev, Sergei, Olga Lazareva, Andrei Rachinsky, Serguei Tsoukhlo, 2004, “Corporate
Governance in Russian Industry,” CEFIR Working Paper No. 32.
11. Goldman, E., Rocholl, J. and So, J. (2006), “Does political connectedness affect firm value?”, working paper, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, available at: http://finance. eller.arizona.edu/documents/seminars/2006-7/EGoldman.Politics10-06.pdf (accessed 15 April 2011).
12. Gompers, P., Ishii, J. and Metrick, A. (2003), “Corporate governance and equity prices”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 118, pp. 107-55.
13. Guthrie, K., Sokolowsky, J. and Wan, K.M. (2010), “CEO compensation and board structure revisited”, Journal of Finance, Forthcoming.
14. Holderness, C.G. (2009), “The myth of diffuse ownership in the United States”, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22, pp. 1377-408.
15. Holthausen, D., Larcker, D., 1996. The financial performance of reverse leverage buyouts. Journal of Financial Economics 42, 293-332.

*Contents are provided by Authors of articles. Please contact us if you having any query.






Bank Details